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COMMENTS
The FTC's Power To' Seek Preliminary Injunctions
in Anti-Merger Cases
Congress vested responsibility for enforcement of the antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act1 in the Department of Justice, 2
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),3 and private parties who
claim to be injured by a merger. 4 Courts permit the Department of
Justice to use almost all remedial measures "reasonably necessary"
to deal with mergers which are found to be violative of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 5 and the Act expressly authorizes the Department
to seek preliminary relief in the district courts. 6 Comparable statutory authority is also given to private litigants. 7 Until recently,
however, it had always been believed that the FTC did not have
authority to go to· court to obtain preliminary injunctions to bar
corporations from proceeding with mergers which the FTC intended
to attack under section 7. 8 The FTC has often taken the position
I. 15 u.s.c. §§ 12-27 (1964).
2. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See generally Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 CoLU:M. L. REV. 500 (1964). Arguably, the FTC was originally
intended to play a much more limited role than the Justice Department in the enforcement of the Clayton Act. See generally G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
19-27 (1924). Moreover, ever since the enactment of the Clayton Act there has been a
continuing debate over the remedial power available to these enforcing bodies. See
generally Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets: Observations on Its Scope,
Objective and Limitations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1966).
4. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1964).
5. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323,
329, 331 (1961). See also N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, 1965 ANTITRUSf LAw Sn.lPOSIUM 37-38
(Trade Reg. Rep. ed.). The Justice Department's remedial measures spoken of in this
connection are measures ancillary to or in lieu of divestiture. The FTC, however, has
had considerable difficulty persuading the courts that its remedial powers are as broad.
E.g., FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623 (1927) (suggesting that since it was
created by statute, "the commission exercises only the administrative functions delegated to it by Congress"). See also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) and
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) for other statements concerning those
remedial powers available to the FTC.
6. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964).
7. 15 u.s.c. § 26 (1964).
8. As Mr. Justice Fortas observed, this view was even "repeatedly stated by spokesmen for the FTC." FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 637-40 (1965) (appendix to
dissent). See, e.g., Ekco Prods. Co., 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1J 71,487 (FTC 1964);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 465 (1956); id. ser. 15, at 28 (1956).
See also Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, at 93 (1961); Dixon, Recent Developments in FTC
Enforcement, 18 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUsr LAw 107, 114 (1961}; Dixon, Significant New
Developmen·ts, 21 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRusr LAw 247, 255 (1962). Moreover, Mr. Justice
Fortas was unable to find any commentator who disagreed with this limited conception of the FTC's power. For authorities which he cites as endorsing this limited
position, see 384 U.S. at 614 n.2.
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that it needs this authority to enjoin mergers in advance of their
consummation in order to effectuate its enforcement powers.9 Its
argument is that if companies are allowed to proceed with their
merger plans while FTC proceedings are taking place, then by the
time the proceedings are completed it may be highly difficult, if not
impossible, for a :final order of divestiture to restore a competitive
market situation.10 Admittedly, such mergers are not entirely immune from attack under section 7 in the absence of FTC authority
to obtain preliminary relief. The FTC could always request the
Department of Justice to seek an injunction restraining a proposed
merger. 11 The FTC, however, has never believed that the mere
power to make such a preliminary reference to the Justice Department adequately effectuates the purposes of the statute; under the
9. See generally id. at 636-40. On only one occasion has a court granted such power,
and in that instance it was granted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, not to the ITC. Furthermore, without such preliminary relief the potential
jurisdiction of a court of appeals would have been eliminated. Board of Governors
v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1950); see note 53 infra and accompanying text.
IO. Completion of a merger will often mean that the merging companies no longer
have available to them the personnel and management necessary for their independent
existence. Moreover, because of the delay usually attendant to ITC adjudication of
mergers, mergers not enjoined before their consummation may already have returned
a substantial profit by the time they are found to be illegal. Often this delay will also
mean that the separate reputations of the merging firms will no longer be intact when
the ITC concludes its proceedings, and this loss of separate identities may make orders
of divestiture an unrealistic solution. See generally Daly, Current Trends in Relief
Under the Clayton Act, 70 DICK. L. R.Ev. 1 (1965); Edwards, Tests of Probable Effect
Under the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BuLL. 369 (1964); see note 39 infra.
The procedure used by the ITC in entering a final order of divestiture has been
described as follows:
The essence of ITC enforcement is an administrative order requiring the
offending corporation to divest itself of the illegally acquired stock or assets. Prior
to entering such an order, the ITC must issue a complaint to the corporation
and to the Attorney General, hold a Commission hearing where the corporation
may show cause why an order for divestiture should not be entered, and make
a written report of the hearing. If the Commission then determines that the
merger will violate the Clayton Act, it issues a cease and desist order to compel the
corporation to divest itself of the stock or assets acquired through the merger.
[Clayton Act § ll(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964)]. The administrative order to cease
and desist becomes final upon expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition
for review in the court of appeals. [Clayton Act § ll(g), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(g) (1964)].
If review is requested by the corporation and the ITC order is affirmed, the
court of appeals then issues its own order commanding obedience to the final
ITC order. [Clayton Act § ll(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964)]. Violations of the final
ITC order are subject to heavy civil fines. [Clayton Act § 11(1), 15 U.S.C. § 21(1)
(1964)].
Note, 15 KAN. L. REv. 196 (1966). The delay involved in these proceedings has in fact
prevented an effective order of divestiture on several occasions, e.g., United States v.
Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United States v. FMC Corp., 218
F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.), appellate juris. denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), affd, 84 S. Ct.
•i (1963) (Goldberg, J., in chambers). See generally Note supra.
11. It has been suggested that the Justice Department may be required to seek a
preliminary injunction upon FTC request. See .J. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST
L\ws 321 (1958).
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existing statutory framework it is doubtful whether the FTC could
make the reference without yielding control of the case. 12
In FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 13 the Supreme Court recently ruled
in a 5-4 decision, that the FTC can seek a preliminary injunction
from a federal circuit court of appeals in anti-merger cases. Thus, it
closed the gap in the FTC's enforcement powers and substantially
eliminated the historical imbalance between the authority of the
Department of Justice and that of the FTC. This Comment will
examine the bases and the implications of the Supreme Court's
holding. It will point out a number of problems raised by granting
the FTC this remedial power, and will suggest that the situations in
which preliminary injunctions may be obtained from a court of
appeals should be strictly limited.

I.

THE DEAN

Foons

LITIGATION

In the Dean Foods case, the FTC attacked the proposed merger
of Dean Foods and Bo,;vman Dairy, two of the nation's largest dairy
companies, 14 on the ground that the merger would violate section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),15 which prohibits
unfair methods of competition, and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 16
12. The Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary has
explained this resultant loss of control in the following manner:
[C]areful scrutiny of the language of section 15 of the Clayton Act empowering
the Attorney General to seek injunctions reveals that its provisions are not sufficient to carry out the intent of Congress in amended section 7. Under the provisions of section 15, if the Attorney General were successful in obtaining an
injunction from a District Court in aid of the Federal Trade Commission, the
court itself would be required to "[p]roceed, as soon as may be, to hearing and
determination of the case.'' Thus, upon the obtaining of a district court injunction, the administrative proceeding would be at an end and the Commission
would no longer have any power to hear and determine the case. This would
defeat the statutory intent expressed in sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act of
having the Federal Trade Commission hear and decide merger cases.
H.R. REP. No. 1889, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1956).
13. 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (majority opinion per Clark, J., joined by Justices Warren,
Brennan, Black &: Douglas; dissenting opinion per Fortas, J., joined by Justices
Harlan, Stewart &: White).
14. On December 13, 1965 respondents entered into a merger agreement which
provided for a transfer of assets on January 3, 1966 (later extended to January 10 by
the parties). At this time Dean Foods Co. was approximately the twelfth largest dairy
company in the United States, and the third or fourth ranking seller of packaged milk
in the Chicago Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO) Area (Cook, DuPage, Kane,
Lake and Will Counties, Illinois; Lake County, Indiana) with sales of $73 million,
total assets of $25 million, and a net income of $2.8 million before taxes. Dean Foods
Co. controlled 7% of the packaged milk sales in the Chicago FMMO Area. Bowman
Dairy Co. was about the eleventh largest dairy company in the United States, and
the first or second ranking seller of packaged milk in the Chicago FMMO Area with
nearly 16% of the total sales. See Papers filed in principal case with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Dec. 30, 1965 [hereinafter cited as Papers] (on file in
the offices of the Michigan Law Review).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964) ("Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.'').
16. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964):
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which prohibits one corporation from acquiring another when "the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly." After filing its complaint, the FTC
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to enjoin
the companies from consummating their proposed merger pending
completion of the FTC's adjudication of its complaint. 17 The court
denied the requested injunction, holding that under the Clayton
Act the FTC could only exercise powers delegated to it by Congress
in section 11, and that section 11 did not authorize the FTC to
obtain preliminary injunctions. 18 On appeal, 19 the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit.20 The Supreme Court held that the FTC could properly seek the preliminary
injunction in the court of appeals which has the authority under
the All Writs Act to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of" its jurisdiction,21 since consummation of the merger might create
a situation in which the court of appeals would be unable to enforce
an effective remedial order.
On remand, the Seventh Circuit held hearings on the FTC's
petition for a preliminary injunction, and enjoined Dean and Bowman from proceeding with their proposed merger for a period of
four months from the date of the order. 22 The court based its deNo corporation •.• shall acquire ..• any part of the stock ... and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
... any part of the assets of another corporation ..• where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
17. The complaint, which charged violations of the antimonopoly laws, was issued
on December 22, 1965 and was followed on December 30, 1965 by a petition seeking
an injunction against the contemplated merger. On January 4, 1966 the court of
appeals entered a temporary restraining order enjoining consummation of the merger
until five days after the denial of any injunctive relief.
18. Relief was denied the FTC on January 19, 1966. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356
F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1966).
15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1914) provides in pertinent part that:
If upon such a hearing the Commission . . . shall be of the opinion that any of
the provisions of said sections have been or are being violated, it shall make a
report in writing, in which it shall state its findings as to the facts, and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist . . . .
See discussion thereon in note 3 supra.
19. On January 24, 1966 the Supreme Court, per Clark, J., ordered a temporary
stay, restraining respondents from making any material changes with respect to the
assets purchased or Bowman's corporate structure. This order permitted Dean to sell
Bowman's retail home delivery routes upon terms and conditions acceptable to the
FTC, but required that any milk supplied by Dean to such purchasers continue to be
delivered from former Bowman plants under the Bowman label. The FTC filed its
petition for certiorari on January 31, 1966, certiorari being granted on February 18,
1966.
20. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964).
22. The court's order, issued on July 18, 1966, enjoined Dean and Bowman from
making any material changes "with respect to the capital stock or corporate struc-

146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:142

cision on the belief that it was "reasonably probable" that the FTC
would find the merger agreement in violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. 23 Contrary to the Seventh
Circuit's prediction, the FTC hearing examiner dismissed the complaint on the ground that the evidence did not support the allegations,24 but his decision was reversed by the FTC, which held, one
Commissioner dissenting, that the proposed acquisition "had the
probability of substantially lessening competition." 25
II.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The legal foundation for the Supreme Court's decision that the
FTC can institute proceedings in a court of appeals to obtain a preliminary injunction was not overly impressive, as the dissent by
Justice Fortas makes clear. 26 The FTC's responsibilities are defined
by statute, thus it was unclear whether the agency could bring such
an action absent express statutory authorization, 27 especially since,
although both the Department of Justice28 and the FTC29 have
ture of Bowfund Corporation, or with respect to assets purchased by Dean from
Bowman pursuant to their agreement" for a period of four months. FTC v. Dean
Foods Co., Slip Opinion No. 15,493 (7th Cir. July 18, 1966). The reference to the Bowfund
Corporation is explained by the fact that as of July 19, 1966 the Bowman Dairy
articles of incorporation were amended so as to change its name from Bowman Dairy
Co. to Bowfund Corporation.
23. Id.
24. In re Dean Foods Co., FTC Proceedings, Doc. No. 8674 (Initial Decision Sept.
7, 1966).
25. In re Dean Foods Co. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,i 17,765
(FTC 1966). In dissent, Commissioner Elman asserted that the integrity of the Com•
mission's adjudicatory function had been impaired by its statements to the court of
appeals during argument on the preliminary injunction. He stated:
Judicial open-mindedness requires that there be no prejudgment of the merits,
actual or apparent. Any expressions or hint in the injunction proceeding that
the Commission has already formed a judgment adverse to the respondents on the
basic factual issues of the case completely destroys that appearance of openmindedness which is essential to fair adjudication.
Id. ,I 17,765 at 23, 126.
26. 384 U.S. 597, 612-40 (1966).
27. For cases recognizing the authority of agencies to petition the courts for relief,
see Public Utilities Comm'n v. Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 883 (1950); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Atlantic &: Gulf-Panama Canal Zone, 241
F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies
and Procedures § 45 (1951). For cases denying such authority, see FTC v. International
Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
148 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 324 U.S. 837, judg. vacated as moot, 325 U.S.
833 (1945), subsequently disapproved in West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) petition for cert. dismissed on petitioner's
motion, 336 U.S. 908 (1949); Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S.
597, 615-18 (1966).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964) (vesting district courts with jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of the act at the suit of the Government).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See note 3 supra.
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concurrent jurisdiction to enforce section 7, only the Department
of Justice was expressly authorized to institute temporary injunction
proceedings.30 Moreover, the power to seek preliminary injunctive
relief was also expressly given to private litigants threatened with
loss or damage from antitrust violations.31 Congress' failure to grant
such express authority to the FTC32 might well justify an inference
that it did not intend to delegate to the FTC the same duties with
respect to restraining Clayton Act violations as it delegated to the
Department of Justice or to private litigants.33 Furthermore, be,
30. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). However, a private party must demonstrate that, unless
the order is issued, irreparable loss or damage will result.
32. It is noteworthy that on a number of occasions Congress has expressly authorized other administrative agencies to seek, and the district court to grant, temporary relief in aid of the agency's general enforcement authority. See, e.g., Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1964); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1964);
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964); Public Utility Holding Act,
15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1964); Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § SOa-41 (1964); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1964); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 825m(a) (1964); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964); Atomic Energy Act,
42 u.s.c. § 2280 (1964).
The FTC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are expressly empowered
to preserve the status quo pending some administrative determinations. For example,
under the Food and Drug provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC
is given a power closely analogous to the authority which it sought in Dean Foods,
that is, the power to seek, in a district court, a temporary injunction against false
advertising or misbranding of food, drugs and cosmetics. Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(a) (1964). For further examples of specific authorization regarding the FTC, see
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1964); Wool Products Labeling Act,
15 U.S.C. § 68(e)(b) (1964); Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 69g(b); Textile
Fiber Products Identity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70£ (1964). Regarding the NLRB, see National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j) & (f) (1964) (NLRB is required to seek temporary injunction when it has reason to believe that jurisdictional strikes or secondary
boycotts exist). The Federal Power Commission (FPC), Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) have also been
authorized to preserve the status quo through the issuance of their own orders.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1964) (FPC); 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1964) (FCC); 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(g),
318(c) (1964) (ICC).
33. For an application of the doctrine that exclusio amus est exclusio alterius, that
the express grant of authority to one body is an implied denial to another, see SEC
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 148 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1945). However, this maxim
has generally been used only as an aid to construction, and arguably should not be
allowed to contravene the purpose of an act. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349,
356 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R. Is. &: Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 649 (1934). Therefore, it would appear that at least a
modicum of evidence showing congressional intent to withhold that power which the
agency considers vital is required before the maxim can be applied:
Presumptively a court of equity has the power to effectuate the purposes of a
statute by maintaining the status quo where necessary. If the party seeking relief
will suffer irreparable harm of a sort which it is the purpose of the statute to
avoid, there is a prima fade case for relief pendente lite. It should require clear
statutory language to find a purpose to exclude the judicial powers traditionally
available for such purposes.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 685 (1965). See the dissent of Mr.
Justice Fortas in Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 615-18, where he argues that Congress did
not intend to give to the FTC by implication what it had given to private parties and
the Justice Department by express grant.
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tween 1956 and the decision in Dean Foods, the FTC had supported
a number of legislative proposals which would have given it express
authority temporarily to enjoin proposed mergers, but none of the
proposals had been adopted by Congress.34 Arguably, this fact indicates that even the FTC believed it lacked power to seek preliminary
relief, absent express statutory authorization, and, in addition, that
Congress was reluctant to confer the requested power.
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, dismissed these
possible objections and adopted the FTC's argument that without
this power there would be a gap in its enforcement authority. The
Court stated that "it would stultify Congressional purpose to say
that the Commission did not have this incidental power to ask
Courts of Appeal to exercise their authority under the All Writs
Act." 35 Further, the Court examined legislative history and concluded that it did not evidence congressional disapproval of FTC
authority to seek preliminary relief from a court of appeals.36 Thus,
although this power had not been delegated directly to the FTC, the
34. The bills were proposed to clarify the FTC's power to seek injunctive relief
and to confirm such authority through specific legislative authorization, thus avoiding
any implication that the FTC did not in fact have such power. See S. REP. No. 2817,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1956):
Effective enforcement of Section 7 requires that ... the Federal Trade Commission
have clear authority to seek court action to enjoin mergers of questionable legality
prior to their consummation.... The FTC ... has no such authority.
(emphasis added); Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 29 (1956): "The Commission should have
specific legislative authority granting it the right to seek and obtain injunctions upon
proper showing •..." (emphasis added). See generally 384 U.S. at 636-40 (appendix
to dissent).
35. 384 U.S. at 606.
36. For the Court's reaction to congressional failure to act on the FTC's proposals,
see 384 U.S. at 609-12.
The legislative history of the Clayton Act is noticeably devoid of exact delineation
of those powers available to the FTC. See Arrow-Hart &: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC,
291 U.S. 587, 606 (1934), where Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Brandeis and
Cardozo stated, in their dissent, that it should not "be said that the purpose of the
[Clayton Act] must be defeated because the law-makers did not attempt to provide
with a meticulous precision how the Commission should proceed in every contingency
that might arise." Similarly, some recent cases suggest that a federal court may take
any reasonable action necessary to insure the proper administration of the functions
with which an administrative agency has been entrusted. Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Atlantic &: Gulf-Panama Canal Zone, 241 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see 79
HARV. L. REV. 391, 402-04 (1965); cf. J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Furthermore, in some situations where Congress has desired to deny access to the
courts, it has done so in express terms. See, e.g., Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern
Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 673 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), overruled on other grounds, Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941); INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7421; Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 u.s.c.
§§ 101-15 (1964); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. But see
Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 257 F.2d 229, 230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1958); cf. United States v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours &: Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 (1961). But cf. Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Trans-Pacific Freight Conf.
v. Federal Maritime Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

November 1967]

Comments

149

Court decided that it was necessary for the effective performance of
the FTC's duties and, not having been expressly denied, it should
be treated as an ancillary power granted by implication.37
On the basis of policy, the majority's result does at first glance
seem consistent with the general aim of section 7 of the Clayton Act
-to arrest anti-competitive mergers in their incipiency38-and of
section 5 of the FTC Act-to prevent unfair competition.39 Certainly, divestiture alone had proved to be an inadequate remedy. 40
Moreover, it can reasonably be argued that the drafters of this
legislation meant only to spell out specific areas of FTC concern,
and not to enumerate the particular remedial procedures that the
FTC could use to prevent the proscribed conduct.41 In fact, the
Supreme Court had previously conceded that an extensive array of
implied enforcement powers were available to the FTC.42 Given
37. 384 U.S. at 607-08.
38. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4296 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 7 (1955).
39. The FTC's authority to prevent the paralyzing effects of unlawful mergers
would, in this context, be based on its authority to deal with "unfair methods of
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See generally FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957); FTC v. Cooper, 1962 Trade Cas. ~ 70,353
(S.D.N.Y.); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176
(1955); Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
500 (1964); cf. Duke, Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1192 (1963).
40. See Duke, note 39 supra; Zimmerman, note 39 supra; Divestiture Problems in
Merger Cases, BNA ANTITRUST &: TRADE REG. REP. No. 196, at B-1 (April 13, 1965);
Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1583-97 (1966);
note 10 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Chrysler Corp., 1964
Trade Cas. ~ 71,207 (D.N.J.).
Consonant with the broad view of the remedial powers available to it under § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act [United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963)], the FTC's recent stand is that it has broad equitable powers under
§ 11 of the Clayton Act. See Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. ~ 17,398, at 22,606 (FTC 1965); Freuhauf Trailer Co., [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 17,292 (FTC 1965); Ekco Prods. Co., 1965 TRADE REG.
REP. ~ 71,487 (FTC 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). In formulating a remedy
in Ekco, supra, the FTC stated:
This is not to say that the Commission is, in all respects, a "court of equity."
One difference between the Commission's powers under section 11 and the powers
of the Federal District Courts under section 15 may be that the courts, by virtue
of their express authority "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Clayton Act,
but not the Commission, can enjoin a merger in advance of consummation.
Id. n.10.
41. See 51 CONG, REc. 14,090-16,144 (1914); Henderson, supra note 3, at 36-40; MacIntyre, The Federal Trade Commission After 50 Years, 1964 TRADE REG. REP. 61,
103-04. See also note 36 supra.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); cf.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13
(1946). For the FTC's view of its own powers under § 11, see Beatrice Foods Co., [19651967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 17,398 (FTC 1965); Freuhauf Trailer Co.,
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,292 (FTC 1965). For a view of the
role originally contemplated for the FTC, see HENDERSON, supra note 3, at 21-27.
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these considerations, a decision barring the FTC-a governmental
body which was expressly designated to administer merger violations
and which presumably acts in accordance with its expert view of the
public good-from seeking preliminary relief in the courts, while
any private litigant claiming to be injured can do so if it suits his
private interests, would seem anomalous. 43
As noted earlier, the statutory basis of the Court's decision was
neither the Clayton Act nor the FTC Act, which the court also
found to be silent on the matter, 44 but rather the All Writs Act,
which provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.45
Since its creation the FTC has gradually accepted increasing responsibility for enforcement of the Clayton Act. See 51 CONG. R.Ec. 11,083-2,146 (1914); MacIntyre, note 41
supra. In fact, it has been stated that the FTC was intended from the beginning to
be the body primarily responsible for the administration of the Clayton Act. Elman,
Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV, L.
REv. 385 (1964). But see HENDERSON, supra note 3. In fact, as of November 8, 1962,
the FTC had brought forty-six suits under § 7 of the Clayton Act while the Department of Justice had only brought sixty. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL
BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., MERGERS AND SuPERCONCENTRATION 271-72 (Comm. Print
1962).
43. But see 384 U.S. at 618-19, where Mr. Justice Fortas states that the FTC's
expertise was intended to be used to bring "to bear upon the complex economic problems of a merger .•. judgment and experience which can emerge only from careful
factual inquiry, the taking of evidence and the formulation of a report. The Federal
Trade Commission was not intended to be a gun, a carbon copy of the Department of
Justice."
44. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
45. 28 U.S.C. § I65l(a) (1964). This statute provides the clearest source of power
for a federal appellate court desiring to grant injunctive relief. In re Philadelphia
& Reading Coal &: Iron Co., 103 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1939). See also Armstrong v. Board
of Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963); cf. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 246
(1932) ("the issue of the writ may rest upon the ultimate power which we have to
review the case •..."); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910).
Further statutory authority may be found in § 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act which provides:
Upon such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent
irreparable injury, every reviewing court (including every court to which a case
may be taken on appeal from or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a
reviewing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate process to
postpone the effective date of any agency action or preserve status or rights
pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
5 U.S.C. § 1009(d) (1964). Courts have held that the power conferred by this section
may also be extended to a potential reviewing court. E.g., Long Beach Fed'l Sav. &:
Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
Both the courts of appeals and the United States Supreme Court also have inherent
equity power to stay administrative orders. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942); Drath v. FTC (D.C. Cir. 1956) (no opinion), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
917 (1956); cf. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (affirming
power of district court to issue injunction pendente lite pending determination of
income tax suit on the merits); SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 324 U.S. 837 (1945)
(enjoining consummation of recapitulation plan pending review of court of appeals'
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Courts differ as to the degree of necessity they require before issuing
a writ pursuant to this authorization. Some issue such writs when to
do so serves to make their exercise of jurisdiction more efjective; 46
others only grant this relief when their jurisdiction would othenvise
be defeated. 41 In Dean Foods, the Supreme Court apparently did not
adopt the latter view, since if the FTC were not allowed to seek
preliminary relief, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in any
given case would not necessarily be defeated. It would always remain
possible, even if unlikely, that the FTC might be able to fashion an
effective order of divestiture. However, by admitting that an application for a preliminary injunction pending FTC hearings is appropriate under the All Writs Act, the Supreme Court necessarily
acknowledged that the factual situation presented by a proposed
merger is one that can at least threaten the jurisdiction of a federal
circuit court. The theory behind this conclusion is fairly simple. If
a merger is consummated before the FTC can complete its adjudication, then a res in custodia legis may be destroyed-the corporate
structures in existence prior to the merger may be lost beyond
reconstruction.48 The FTC may thereby be prevented from framing
decision affirming district court's denial of injunction); Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank
8: Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. Is. 8: Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935) ("The power to
issue an injunction when necessary to prevent the defeat or impairment of its jurisdiction is ••• inherent ••• in a court of equity.'); FED. R. C1v. P. 62(g).
46. Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 883 (1950). See also Whitney Nat'! Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411 (1965); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Pfaus v. Feder,
88 N.J. Super. 468, 212 A.2d 690 (Super. Ct. 1965); cf. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC,
280 Fed. 45 (1922).
47. FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); cf.,
In re Chappell, 201 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1953); Avon Dairy Co. v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp.
500 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,419 (preliminary
injunction issued), afj'd, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,243 (E.D. Mo.) (divestiture ordered);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,131 (N.D. Cal.) (preliminary
injunction denied), held no violation, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,215 (N.D. Cal.). But see
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69,698 (S.D. Cal.), held no
violation, 233 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Cal. 1964), reversed, 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In fact,
the denial of an injunction has, on occasion, caused the discontinuance of a government suit, it being felt that not even a final divestiture order could restore effective
competition. E.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963),
appellate juris. denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), afj'd, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963); United
States v. Gimbel Bros., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962). See also 1964 BNA ANTITRUsr
& TRADE REG. REP. No. 180, at B-2.
In a large number of cases a final determination on the merits has been avoided
because agreements to merge have been terminated upon the granting of preliminary
relief. E.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Corp., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), a[fd, 320 F.2d
509 (3d Cir. 1963), consent decree, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,074 (W.D. Pa.); United States
v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 11 71,659 (W.D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Parents
Magazine Enterprises, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,437 (N.D. Ill.), 1963 Trade Cas.
11 70,649 (N.D. Ill.). See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,131
(N.D. Cal.), complaint dismissed, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,215 (N.D. Cal.); Note, 79
HARV. L. REV. 391, 400 (1965). See also notes 10 8: 40 supra.
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an effective order, and the circuit court deprived of the opportunity
to enforce such an order. On this ground, the Supreme Court invoked the All Writs Act.
That the All Writs Act might be used to confer this power on
the FTC was not a novel idea when the Supreme Court adopted it.
In the only two cases close to being on point with Dean Foods, the
Second and Ninth Circuits differed on the question of whether they
were authorized under the All Writs Act to grant temporary injunctions pending the outcome of administrative hearings examining
the legality of a proposed merger. In Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 49 the Ninth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction
preventing the respondent corporation from acquiring the assets of
certain banks until the administrative agency could determine
whether the acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. Since
the agency was without any statutory authority to protect its own
jurisdiction, the court reasoned that it (the court) had authority
under the All Writs Act to issue an injunction pendente lite in
order to "prevent frustration of the ultimate exercise of its jurisdiction even before an appealable or reviewable order has been entered
• • • • " 50 Six years later, the Second Circuit, in FTC v. International
Paper Co., 51 denied the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction
in a similar case. The court emphasized that it was improper to use
the All Writs Act as a basis for granting the injunction because the
"pattern of enforcement adopted by the Congress in the Clayton Act
makes clear that the Commission was not intended to have such
authority . . . ." 52 The Supreme Court in Dean Foods, clearly rejected the Second Circuit's position on this question.

III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEAN FOODS

The Supreme Court's conclusion that logic and policy support
giving the FTC a power which it needs to carry out the mandate of
the Clayton Act loses some of its attractiveness under the weight of
practical considerations which suggest that the courts of appeals may
49. 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950), cited with approval
in Whitney Nat'! Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Pfaus
v. Feder, 88 N.J. Super. 468, 212 A.2d 690 (Super. Ct. 1965).
It is significant that since the Third Circuit set aside the FTC's order of divestiture
in 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), the Ninth Circuit never
actually invoked the All "\Vrits Statute in aid of its own jurisdiction.
50. 184 F.2d at 315. The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Transamerica and Dean Foods
could easily have been distinguished on their facts, for in Transamerica the agency
could not have ordered divestiture after the planned acquisition. The power to require
divestiture of acquired assets as well as stock was not conferred upon the FTC until
1950. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964). Thus, in Transamerica the merger would have absolutely
defeated the jurisdiction of the agency. This was not the case in Dean Foods; in fact,
the Dean Foods case was closer to International Paper which dealt with acquired
stock. See note 51 infra.
51. 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956).
52. Id. at 373.
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be an unsuitable forum for hearing these petitions for preliminary
relief. It is submitted that only if close limits are imposed upon
the FTC's use of this power, which is at present ill defined, will it
prove useful in effectuating the purposes of the Clayton Act. The
third part of this Comment will discuss some of the implications and
difficulties which follow from the Dean Foods decision, and will
explain why and how the decision should be limited.
A. Standards

The availability of preliminary and final relief for violations of
section 7 are closely related. As noted earlier, unless companies are
temporarily prevented from merging pending FTC adjudication
of the legality of the merger arrangement, fully effective final relief
by divestiture may prove impossible. However, since mergers are a
commonplace business phenomenon, if clear and reliable criteria
are not established for determining what acquisitions should be preliminarily enjoined, many mergers will be "subjected to paralyzing
uncertainties for years, to the detriment of effective planning and
vigorous exploitation of the possibilities of the merged company." 53
Moreover, it is inevitable that the strictness of the test adopted will
have a great effect upon the number of petitions for injunctions
brought before the courts of appeals, and ultimately upon the
effectiveness of enforcement of section 7 by the FTC. Thus, one
very important question raised by Dean Foods is what standard
should the courts of appeals apply in ruling on FTC requests for
preliminary injunctions.
The most natural, and seemingly simple, approach to this problem would be to adopt the same procedural standard employed by
the district courts in reviewing Justice Department petitions for
temporary injunctions. 54 Presumably, this is the same standard that
the courts would apply to petitions by private individuals. 55 How53. Edwards, Tests of Probable Effect Under the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL.
369 (1964).
54. The use of preliminary injunctions may well be confined to those cases in
which illegality is reasonably clear. See Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Application of the .Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965). The following cases have required a prima facie showing of illegality: United States v. Chrysler
Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (D.N.J. 1964) (preliminary injunction granted); United
States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (denying a preliminary motion whereby the Government sought for the first time to obtain an
injunction against a conglomerate merger); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp.
817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
55. Private parties have obtained injunctions barring violations of § 7 of the
Clayton Act, but the cases have typically involved situations wherein one corporation
attempts to prevent another from purchasing its stock on the market, or to prevent
it from voting such stock. See, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf &: Western
Industries, Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1964); Crane Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d
747 (6th Cir. 1960); Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956).
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ever, the various district courts in passing on Justice Department
petitions for injunctive relief have not adopted any uniform standard. Some courts grant preliminary relief if the petitioner raises
"serious and substantial questions" about the merits of the merger; 56
others apply a stricter test and require a showing that it is reasonably probable that the petitioner will win on the merits in a full
trial; 57 still others demand that the petitioner demonstrate a clear
probability of final success.58
In practice, which one of these possible standards is ultimately
adopted may not prove too significant. The Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 50 so expands the
potential substantive coverage of section 7 that virtually any horizontal merger which the FTC chooses to attack may require preliminary restraint under all of the tests suggested above. In Von's
Grocery, the Supreme Court found that a merger between two local
retailers whose total grocery sales comprised 7.5% of the total
dollars of retail sales in the relevant market violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act, primarily because the merger occurred in a market
which was undergoing a threatening trend toward concentration.
When the Seventh Circuit heard the Dean Foods case on remand,
the FTC, basing its position on the Von's Grocery decision, argued
as follows: (1) where there is a trend toward fewer and fewer dairies
and a merger occurs between two leading companies, a presumption
arises that the effect of the merger will be substantially to lessen
competition; and (2) such a showing constitutes sufficient grounds
for issuing a preliminary injunction. 60
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the FTC that, in the light of
Von's Grocery, it was reasonably probable that the FTC would find
the merger in violation of section 7, 61 and it found that this was
No case has been found in which a private party obtained an injunction against
a merger of the type at issue in Dean Foods.
56. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.),
affd, 206 F.2d 738 {2d Cir. 1953); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 1956 Trade Cas.
,r 68,244 (E.D. Mo.), plenary judgment granted, 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd,
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
57. See Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 182 (E.D. Mich. 1960);
United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. ,r 71,366 (D.N.J.).
58. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal.), appellate jurisdiction denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), affd, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963).
59. 384 U.S. 270 (1964).
60. It is noteworthy that the dairy industry has been described as the "most
merger-prone industry." STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87th CONG.,
2D SESS., REPORT ON MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION 26 (Comm. Print. 1962). The size
of the two dairies contemplating merger in Dean Foods is discussed at note 14 supra.
61. 347 F.2d 745, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1965). As a result of the merger, Dean Dairy Co.
would have controlled about 23% of the packaged milk market. This percentage,
coupled with the concentration of the industry and the relevant market in the Chicago area, indicate that the merger might well have violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.
Papers, note 14 supra. Dean Foods Co., however, has consistently urged that the
reselling of Bowman's home delivery business to smaller dairies following the acquisi-
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enough to warrant granting the requested relief. 62 This reliance on
Von's Grocery indicates that in granting preliminary relief the
court used a different substantive standard than that which the
Supreme Court had previously laid dmvn in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.63 There, in ruling on a Department of
Justice suit for injunctive relief, the Court had stated:
A merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anti-competitive effects. 64
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of this standard in favor of the one
applied in Von's Grocery reflects a trend in section 7 litigation; the
courts are now demanding less and less proof of concentration or
anti-competitive effect before proscribing mergers under section 7. 65
As a result of this development, it may well become a moot question
whether the FTC need show a "serious and substantial" question, or
a reasonable probability of a violation, or a clear probability of final
success.
To determine whether or not Von's Grocery is precedent for
finding a violation in the context of the Dean Foods merger would
involve a complicated analysis of the facts of the Von's Grocery case
and speculation as to what the Court intended the breadth of its
holding in Von's to be. This is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Still, regardless of the substantive standard applied, the Seventh
Circuit's order granting temporary relief presents a problem as to
the procedural standard to apply. The court framed the preliminary
injunction issue not in terms of finding a reasonable probability that
the FTC would ultimately win on the merits, but rather of finding
a reasonable probability that the FTC would find a violation.66
tion, thus dispersing a large percentage of that business among a great many smaller
firms and making entry by other small firms into the market more attractive, has
revitalized smaller dairies in the Chicago market. See, e.g., Answering Brief of Respondent Before Federal Trade Commission at 33-36 (Oct. 24, 1966).
62. The court granted the injunction on the basis of a showing that it was "reasonably probable that the purchase agreement . . . between Dean and Bowman may be
determined by the Federal Trade Commission to be in violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 and section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l)." Order granting petition for preliminary injunction, No. 15,493, at
2-3 (Slip Opinion, July 18, 1966). See note 22 supra. Compare the standards adopted by
the district courts in ruling on government motions for preliminary injunctions in notes
56-60 supra.
63. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
64. Id. at 363.
65. See THE SUPREME COURT, 1965 TERM, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 245 (1966).
66. See note 61 supra.
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At first glance, the very fact that the FTC is seeking the injunction
would appear to satisfy this test. In fact, one member of the FTC,
in dissenting from the holding that the Dean-Bowman merger was
illegal, vigorously maintained that some of the FTC's remarks before the court of appeals during argument on the petition for temporary relief impaired the integrity of the FTC's adjudicatory function and thereby rendered it an unsuitable forum for a later hearing
on the merits. 67
This problem of FTC prejudice which is raised by the Seventh
Circuit's test is one which Congress attempted to meet in the Administrative Procedure Act by protecting the adjudicative function
of agencies from prosecutorial contamination.68 The courts, too,
have demonstrated concern when the functions of investigator,
prosecutor, and adjudicator are rolled into one.69 However, since
these functions are in practice performed by different divisions
within the FTC,70 it is submitted that this allocation effectuates such
internal separation of duties that the danger of prejudice is kept to
a minimum. 71
67. See note 25 supra. The "appearance of justice" standard which the ITC is
required to maintain may be violated if its actions border on prosecution. See Texaco,
Inc. v. ITC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964); American Cyanamid Co. v. ITC, 1966
Trade Cas. ,r 71,807 (6th Cir. 1966). See also Motion and Supporting Memorandum
of Respondent Dean Foods Co. for An Order Dismissing The Appeal [to the Full
Federal Trade Commission] and Allowing The Initial Decision to Become the Decision of the Commission, FTC Doc. No. 8674, at 10 (1966).
68. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1964). The
separation of functions theory is discussed generally in 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
1f 13.01-.11 (1958).
69. E.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41-49 (1950).
70. See organization chart of the ITC, 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,039, at 9556.
71. See 8 B.C. COMM. &: IND. L. REv. 360, 366-67 (1966):
The Commission has a separate office of hearing examiners whose members are
involved in neither the investigating nor prosecuting activities of the Commission.
It is their duty to conduct "fair and impartial" hearings on the merits of a case.
Under the Commission's rules of procedure, a party to an ITC action may file a
motion seeking removal of an examiner believed to be biased. There has apparently been no procedure yet established for exercising the Commission's new power
to seek preliminary relief. Under the Commission's present organization, the most
logical office to file a petition for preliminary relief would be the office of the General Counsel. This office presently defends the Commission's decisions in the courts
of appeal. If the ITC's new power is administered in this way, there should at
least be no personal involvement on the part of the hearing officers in a petition
for a temporary injunction brought before the court of appeals. In any event, it
should be no more difficult for the Commission to make an objective decision
after a preliminary injunction has been granted than it is for a district court to
do so.
In this regard it is interesting to compare the procedures of the NLRB, which has
statutory power to seek preliminary relief under § IOG) of the National Labor Relations
Act. The Board, in turn, has delegated this responsibility to the agency's regional
directors. 29 C.F.R. § 101.37 (1967). They, however, are under the direct supervision of
the agency's general counsel [29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1966)], and thus for practical purposes
the delegation is to the general counsel. This delegation of § IOG) powers was upheld in
Evans v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ind. 1948). It is suggested that this more explicit differentiation of functions, which has proven highly advantageous in the NLRB context, might well be copied by the FTC. The FTC could

November 1967]

Comments

157

A further problem is evidenced by the proceedings before the
Seventh Circuit. Although the court verbalized a test based on the
reasonable probability that the FTC would find a violation, it appears that it did not give serious attention to the facts upon which
the FTC would have to rely in order to make such a finding. Indeed,
it appears that the Seventh Circuit believed that it was under a
mandate from the Supreme Court to enter the injunction, regardless of the merits. The court, on remand, examined no evidence
other than the affidavits and summaries of factual evidence which
were submitted by the parties to the proceeding; it did not even
consider a summary of the record of the FTC hearing, which by
chance happened to be completed prior to the proceedings in the
court, 72 when that record was made available to it. Given the factual
complexity of merger litigation, the time pressures of a busy court
calendar, and the court's lack of experience in holding original
hearings for injunctive relief, this failure thoroughly to investigate
the facts may not be surprising, but the Seventh Circuit's experience
indicates that the courts of appeals would have trouble applying
even a uniform standard in a consistent fashion.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's reliance on the All
Writs Act, and its emphasis on the fact that consummated mergers
often prevent the subsequent entry of effective orders, require that
all FTC requests for injunctive relief should be carefully assessed
against the strict standard that the injunction be "reasonably necessary" or "urgently necessary" to preserve the divestiture remedy. 73
More particularly, it is recommended that the courts of appeals
impose the following requirements on the FTC in temporary injunction cases: (I) the petition should be filed immediately upon
notice of the proposed merger; 74 (2) the FTC should present eviexpressly delegate responsibility for seeking preliminary relief to its General Counsel,
and, although such delegation would only confirm the natural FTC practice, such a
straightforward recognition and solution of the prejudice problem would seem advantageous.
Another possible way of separating the FTC's adjudicatory function from its investigatory and prosecutory functions would be through the creation of a trade court. The
tax courts provide an obvious precedent. See Kintner, The Trade Court, The ABA,
the Lawyer and the Public Interest, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION PROCEEDINGS 72 (1957);
Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions From Federal Trade Commission to a Trade
Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REV. 199 (1960).
72. The fact that the hearing before the examiner had been completed before
the court of appeals considered the petition for the prliminary injunction was
fortuitous. That the court refused to consider the record of that hearing, and instead
requested the parties to submit their own factual summaries, may indicate a refusal
to undertake a thoroughgoing factual investigation, and without such an investigation,
the proper application of standards is impossible.
73. See notes 105-10, & 113 infra and accompanying text.
74. In Dean Foods such petition was filed on December 30, 1965, seventeen days
after the agreement to merge had been reached, and eight days after the FTC had
filed its complaint against respondents. Cf. Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 1957 Trade
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dence sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood both that the merger
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, and that consummation
of the merger would present a real obstacle to divestiture, if that
remedy proved necessary; 75 and (3) the FTC should show that irreparable harm to the public interest would result if the merger
were not halted pendente lite. 76 Even if these recommendations
were to be accepted, there remains to be considered the host of procedural difficulties which result from having courts of appeals sit
as trial courts.
B. Procedure
The greatest and most obvious difficulty ansmg from the Supreme Court's ruling in Dean Foods is that the decision places a
court of appeals in a position where it must sit as a court of original
jurisdiction and, perhaps, engage in complex fact-finding determinations-a task for which it has neither the "facilities nor the institutional aptitude." 77 Unless it is true that the substantive test to be
applied in merger cases is now so broad that virtually any horizontal
merger violates section 7,78 preliminary hearings for injunctive relief
can be expected to assume "all the essentials of a trial on the
merits," 79 since the court will have to determine the probable competitive effects of a merger which will require making an extended
factual examination of the relevant product and geographical markets. 80 The courts of appeals should not perform this function on
Cas. 'il 68,858 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary injunctive relief to prevent commingling of
assets denied where directors did not act promptly after learning of the intended
acquisition, but stood by while the acquisition was completed).
75. Ordinarily, both elements of a government suit-probable injury to competition and the likelihood of ineffective divestiture-will have to be shown before a
temporary injunction will issue. E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956
Trade Cas. 'i! 68,479 (S.D.N.Y.).
76. Cf. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Note,
79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 391, 393 (1965); see notes 10 & 41 supra.
77. 384 U.S. at 630.
78. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
79. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963), appeal
dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), application for preliminary injunction denied,
84 S. Ct. 4 (1963).
80. It is frequently said that a definitive resolution of inquiries into "probable
competitive effect," "line of commerce" and "section of the country" lies particularly
with the office of the FTC. See, e.g., Elman, supra note 54, at 624:
[T]o determine the probable competitive effects of a merger is very often not
possible without an extended factual inquiry. . . .
Before a merger's legal status can be determined, it is necessary to understand
the market and industry setting of the merger. This requires an economic study.
The Commission's staff of economists and statisticians, with the aid of compulsory
process, where necessary, should be able to conduct such studies; and a staff economic study and report would normally be the first step in the fact-finding process
See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 631 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (factual
economic questions about "line of commerce," "section of the country" and probable
effect upon competition are ones "committed in the first instance to the FTC and not
to the courts."); cf. Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 397 U.S. 411, 421 (1965);
Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
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the basis of affidavits alone. A summary judgment may be permissible when application is made for a stay pending appeal from a
district court ruling a/ter the district court has already heard evidence at a full trial,81 but to allow courts to enter preliminary injunctions for violations of section 7 on only the basis of affidavits
would seemingly invite "justice which is rough and ready, to say
the least."82 Moreover, not only should parties be allowed to present
evidence at hearings on preliminary injunctions, but experience
shows that in its applications for preliminary relief the Department
of Justice has tended to present all the evidence then available to
it.83 Obviously, requiring an appellate court to engage in such a
complete factual examination raises a number of problems. Heretofore, courts of appeals acquired jurisdiction in section 7 cases only
to review a certified transcript of completed FTC proceedings. 84
And, this review was limited, since FTC orders could only be overturned if not supported by substantial evidence. In disposing of
requests for preliminary relief, the courts will usually have no
record, 85 and whatever standard is applied the question they face
should require a closer analysis of the evidence than is necessary in
deciding whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the
FTC's result. Moreover, further problems arise because the federal
appellate courts lack any statute or rules governing venue, service
81. While applications to a court of appeals for a stay pending appeal from a
ruling by a district court may result in the resolution of factual issues on the presentation of affidavits [Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n., 299 F.2d 873, 874 (6th Cir.
1962)], the district court is generally required to hear the evidence in the actual
application for temporary relief. See 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.04, at 1638-39:
On the hearing for the [preliminary] injunction an adequate presentation of
the facts is necessary. • . • The court should normally be reluctant to decide
controverted issues in favor of the movant on the basis of affidavits alone.
For examples of the extensive presentation of evidence which frequently occurs, see
United States v. Penick &: Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965) (6 witnesses called
by Government to testify on alleged impact of reciprocity in the starch industry);
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), afj'd, 320 F.2d
509 (3d Cir. 1963) (5 day hearing); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade Cas.
,r 71,659 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (6 day hearing). See also Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391, 400
(1965). Where factual antitrust issues have been presented, however, summary judgment has been held inappropriate in many cases. See, e.g., United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
82. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 632 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Penick &: Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965);
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963); United States
v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966
Trade Cas. ,r 71,659 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373
(2d Cir. 1956); cf. FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); In re NLRB,
304 U.S. 486 (1938). It is also worth noting that 15 U.S.C. § 2I(c) (1964) expressly
provides that the court of appeals "shall have power • . • to issue such writs as are
ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgment to prevent injury to the
public or to competitors pendente lite."
85. In Dean Foods, although a record was available, the court failed to give it
consideration. See note 72 supra.
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of process, subpoena power, 86 discovery power, or admissibility of
evidence. 87 These procedural shortcomings were summarily noted
by Justice Fortas in his dissent in Dean Foods, 88 and the Seventh
Circuit's confusion on remand demonstrated the correctness of his
views.
One way that courts of appeals may be expected to try to avoid
being swamped by the factual complexity of section 7 cases is to
refer the fact-finding duties to a master or referee, 89 or perhaps even
to the FTC itself as a special referee, since the FTC is supposedly
expert in merger problems. If reference to the FTC should become
the standard practice, it would make sense for the FTC to conduct
its fact-finding hearings before it files its request for a preliminary
injunction with the circuit court. Under this procedure, if the FTC
86. For comparable rules governing district courts, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 22-23 (1964).
For a brief discussion of the procedure followed in fact-finding hearings on motions
for preliminary injunctions in the federal courts, see Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771, 773
(1965).
87. The problem of adopting appropriate rules of evidence in hearings for pre·
liminary relief from alleged violations of § 7 merits special consideration. Generally,
rules of admissibility appear to be more relaxed in administrative proceedings than
in judicial proceedings. The FTC standard is that "[r]elevant, material, and reliable
evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable and unduly repetitious
evidence shall be excluded." 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1967). If the court of appeals is trying to
determine whether it is "reasonably probable" that the FTC will find a violation (as
the Seventh Circuit envisioned its role), it would seem that the court should consider
whatever evidence the FTC would subsequently consider; it should not limit itself
by the more stringent judicial rules, for only by considering the same evidence as
the FTC will subsequently admit can a court make a sound judgment as to what
action the FTC is likely to take. Even if the court of appeals is trying to decide
whether the requested relief is reasonably, or urgently, necessary (as recommended
by this Comment), it would seem that the rules of evidence governing the preliminary proceeding in the court of appeals should still be those which will govern the
subsequent FTC hearing for otherwise the court might find itself excluding evidence
upon which the FTC would later rely in finding a violation necessitating remedial
action.
It may be, however, that the question raised in this footnote is moot, for it has been
said that FTC hearing examiners "give very stringent effect to the rules which govern
non-jury cases in the federal courts." If this is true, it would make no difference
whether the court is nominally applying judicial or agency rules, and it would seem
that the FTC might well revise its regulations to conform with its actual practice.
Compare the regulations governing evidence in NLRB hearings: "Any proceeding shall,
so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable
in the District Courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure • . . .''
29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1967).
88. 384 U.S. at 634-35.
89. This ploy is open to the objection that in so doing the courts of appeals would
be abdicating their judicial function and thus depriving the parties of their right to
trial before a court. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1956), where the
Supreme Court upheld a circuit court writ of mandamus requiring a district court
judge to vacate orders referring an antitrust matter to a master. The La Buy case,
however, is arguably distinguishable from the Dean Foods situation in that La Buy
involved a master making findings on the merits of a case, not simply on the question
of preliminary relief.
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files its findings of fact along with its request for preliminary relief,
the court of appeals can grant or deny a preliminary injunction
without further factual hearings. Such a procedure is not entirely
without precedent, for in a somewhat analogous context-the enforcement of cease and desist orders prior to 1959 under section 11
of the Clayton Act00-the FTC was allowed to conduct hearings on
order violations before seeking judicial enforcement. 91 While the
hearings in the cease and desist order cases have been criticized as
unduly long and cumbersome, 92 part of the explanation for their
duration and complexity is that the FTC conducted adjudicatory
hearings, although the Administrative Procedure Act provides that
such formal hearings are not required in "cases in which an agency
acts as an agent for a court." 93 Since in the section 7 context the FTC
would be acting as the court's agent if appointed master, and would
presumably be interested in an expeditious handling of the preliminary matter so that it could proceed to the merits of the merger
as quickly as possible, the problem of delay might be avoided. However, it is suggested that the FTC's findings in the preliminary hearings may well be reflected in its conclusion on the ultimate legality
of the merger, and if this is the case, the defendant corporations,
despite the Administrative Procedure Act, should be entitled to the
more elaborate processes connected with adjudicatory hearings.
If the courts of appeals do adopt the practice of using the FTC
as a master to avoid burdensome fact-finding chores, and if the
FTC holds pre-filing hearings on the injunction issue as would seem
likely, then it appears that when the FTC finds facts which merit
filing a request for a preliminary injunction, FTC victory will be
virtually assured in a court of appeals. This being true, it would
seem that the entire responsibility for issuing the injunction might
as well have been vested in the FTC from the outset. This prospect,
of course, magnifies the threat of agency prejudice discussed earlier.94
After it has completed an adjudicatory hearing as master and de90. See generally Kauper, FTC v. Jantzen: Blessing, Disaster, or Tempest in a
Teapot?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1523, 1536-40 (1966).
91. FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 {2d Cir. 1951). It should be noted
that in this context there is little danger that the FTC's ruling on the order violation
will prejudice its performance of subsequent responsibilities. Compare note 94 infra and
accompanying text.
92. Kauper, supra note 90.
93. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964).
94. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text. The possible prejudice problem
here is substantially greater than that discussed earlier. The danger of combining
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions can be dissipated by internal separation of
functions. Here, however, we are combining two different adjudicatory tasks in the
FTC, and although different hearing examiners might be used, if an examiner's
decision that the facts warranted a petition for preliminary relief were appealed to
the Commissioners, they would have to draw conclusions as to the probability of a
violation, thus influencing their later adjudication of the merger on its merits.
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cided that the facts warrant a preliminary injunction, the FTC can
hardly be expected to move to another hearing on the merits of the
merger with a fully open mind. It is possible to contend that the
possibility of prejudice here is really no greater than when courts
which have made a prejudgment on adjudicatory facts are allowed to
hear a case a-Second time on remand. Still, despite the advantage of
making use of the FTC's expertise, the possibility of prejudice together with the possibility of cumbersome proceedings should bar
the courts of appeals from turning to the FTC as a master in their
attempt to avoid fact-finding duties. The use of other, impartial
masters or referees, however, seems sensible.
One alternative to the use of a master is, of course, to have the
FTC bring its action for a preliminary injunction in a district
court. 95 However, it is doubtful whether the FTC can do so without
express statutory authorization.96 To the extent that Dean Foods
rests on the All Writs Act, it is no authority for the proposition that
the action may be brought in a district court, since no threat to a
district court's jurisdiction is involved if preliminary relief is unavailable. Yet, Dean Foods does reflect a liberal attitude toward
allowing the FTC powers that have not been specifically granted,
and it is conceivable that the Court might admit that the FTC does
have standing to seek preliminary relief in a district court. This
result would not only reduce the workload of the courts of appeals,
but would send the proceeding to a tribunal which is more familiar
with the fact-finding function than are the appellate courts. It should
be noted that even the district courts might have some difficulty
with this action since even they might find it necessary to apply
unfamiliar FTC rules of evidence.97
If the appellate courts do prove to be the forum to which the
FTC resorts when it wants preliminary injunctions-and, given the
ease with which the FTC finally obtained the injunction from the
Seventh Circuit and the doubt which beclouds its right of access
to the district courts, this would seem the likely result-then the
courts of appeals are placed in a position in which they must serve
as appellate bodies in cases which they have already heard at the trial
level. After they have heard and weighed evidence relevant to the
merits of a case while ruling on the petition for preliminary relief,
if the FTC then finds a violation and issues a cease and desist order,
the courts of appeals will have to consider any appeal from that
order.
It is possible that two different courts of appeals might handle
95. Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
96. See generally The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 258 (1966);
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 360, 368 (1967); 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 157, 159, 164 n.41 (1967).
97. See note 87 supra.
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such a case-one deciding the preliminary injunction issue and the
other the appeal from the FTC's order. Indeed, after one court of
appeals has ruled adversely to a defendant on the preliminary matter,
it would seem likely that the defendant would try to have the appeal
on the merits litigated before another circuit, provided this was
feasible. 98 This possibility raises a question as to the effect to be
given to the findings of the first court in the later proceeding. It can
be said that the virtues of administrative convenience, finality, and
consistency argue for giving binding effect to the prior findings, and
that the "law of the case" doctrine99 should be used to make the findings of the first court of appeals binding upon its fellow circuit
court. However, this position is easily criticized. First, it may be
said that different issues are involved in the two proceedings, since
the first hearing only requires the court to investigate the probability of a violation or irreparable harm, whereas the second requires
the court to find substantial evidence supporting the FTC's finding
of a violation. If this point is valid, "law of the case" cannot be invoked since it applies only to matters previously decided.100 However, although the issue broadly framed may be different in the two
proceedings, some of the same questions are likely to be in dispute
in both, and to these at least the "law of the case" might arguably
apply. Second, the doctrine has never prevented a court from switching its own position on a given matter; 101 if the same court can so
change its mind, it is hard to see why a second equal and coordinate
court should be denied the right to do so. Finally, the fact-finding
role played by the court of appeals which hears the petition for preliminary relief may justify viewing that court not as an appellate
court, but rather as a de facto district court. If so, it is arguable that
its findings should be treated as those of an inferior court, and the
doctrine of "law of the case" would then be inapplicable. Thus, the
better view would seem to be that the findings made by one court of
appeals on the preliminary matter should not be binding when the
98. This possibility is recognized by Justice Fortas who points out that § ll(c)
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964), provides that appeal from an FTC order
may be "in the court of appeals • . • for any circuit within which such violation
occurred or within which such person resides or carries on business." In Dean Foods,
review of the final FTC order might have been sought not in the Seventh Circuit,
but rather in the Sixth or Eighth Circuits, where Dean and Bowman carried on business. 384 U.S. 597, 624 n.12 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
99. Basically, the doctrine is that when a federal court enunciates a rule of law,
it establishes that law which other courts owing obedience to it must, and which it
itself normally will, apply to the same issues in subsequent proceedings in that case.
See generally lb J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.404 (2d ed. 1965).
100. See, e.g., Electric Research Prods. v. Gross, 120 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1941); lb
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.404(1) n.14 (2d. ed. 1965).
101. The power to re-examine questions previously determined is exercised sparingly, but when a court decides that justice so requires, it may in its discretion reopen
such questions. See, e.g., Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912); United States
v. Fullard-Leo, 156 F.2d '756 (9th Cir. 1946).
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FTC findings on the merits of the merger are reviewed in another
court of appeals.
In some cases the same court of appeals will hear both the request for the preliminary injunction and the appeal from the FTC's
finding of a section 7 violation. While in this situation there is no
legal obstacle to the court's changing its mind, 102 the situation does
once again raise a possible prejudice problem. It is questionable
whether, after hearing the evidence and argument on the preliminary injunction issue, a court will still be able to rule fairly on the
question raised on appeal of whether the FTC's finding of a violation was supported by substantial evidence. This possible source of
bias seems less than an ovenvhelmi:qg objection to having courts of
appeals hear requests for preliminary relief, for it would seem simple
enough for them to assure impartiality by using a different panel of
judges in the second proceeding. In addition, if the courts of appeals
all grant preliminary relief almost as a matter of course, as did the
Seventh Circuit in Dean Foods, 103 then they will hardly have looked
at the evidence in the original proceeding, and their minds should
be quite open when they actually examine the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Finally, since it can be contended that the court is
faced with two different issues in the two proceedings, 104 it may be
said that its conclusion on the first need not, in fact, prejudice it on
the second. It is suggested, however, that the latter two arguments
are not altogether convincing, and that if the same court of appeals
does hear both matters then a fresh panel should be used in the
second proceeding.
C.

Orders

The difficulties raised by the Dean Foods decision do not end
with the problems of enunciating a proper standard for granting
preliminary relief and establishing a proper procedure. The case
also leaves considerable confusion as to what the terms of a preliminary order should be. 105 A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Dean Foods indicates two different, though not
mutually exclusive, views as to the real purpose sought to be achieved
by granting preliminary relief in a section 7 case. Justice Fortas'
dissent suggests that a court of appeals' main concern should be
102. Cf. note 99 supra.
103. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
104. See text at note 100 supra.
105. The Department of Justice's frequent use of preliminary relief reflects a
diversity of orders ranging from temporary injunctions which flatly enjoin an acquisition to injunctions imposing a number of conditions designed to maintain the separation and identity of the merging companies. E.g., compare United States v. Greater
Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 'ii 70,380 (W.D.N.Y.), with United States v. Brown
Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 'ii 68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956).
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with preventing the detrimental effects on the economy which result
from mergers which "tend substantially to lessen competition or
create danger of monopoly.'' 106 The logical consequence of such a
position is that the only truly effective preliminary injunction is
one which absolutely prevents the companies from operating together until there has been a factual determination that the merger
is legal. On the other hand, if the predominant concern in granting
preliminary relief is, as Justice Clark speaking for the majority
indicated, 107 with giving the FTC the opportunity to enter an
effective order of divestiture, and thus with giving the courts the
opportunity to enforce such an order, then a court need not at this
preliminary stage bar joint operation entirely. Instead, it can allow
joint operation to the extent that it will not interfere with a later
order of divestiture.
The majority opinion offers no specific guidance as to how a
court may condition or limit its order so that its interference with
normal business activity will be kept to a minimum, and thus it
leaves open several questions. First, should the proposed mergants
be allowed to operate together during the FTC proceedings, and,
if so, to what extent? Certainly, if joint operation is not allowed,
companies who are not in fact in violation of section 7 are inevitably
penalized by the order, for they must either remain in a state of
limbo until the FTC rules on the legality of the proposed merger,
or spend time and effort seeking other ways to accomplish the legitimate ends of the merger. Second, how should the order be framed
to minimize the dissipation of the mergants' capital and personnel
arrangements, and prevent the companies from being so weakened
that they are unable to proceed with the merger when the FTC
finally reaches a determination favorable to them?108 Third, can or
should the acquired company be forced to operate as a separate division or a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring company, pending the FTC adjudication?
In Dean Foods, the Seventh Circuit order read in part as follows:
[D]uring the period of four months from the date of this order ...
[Dean and Bowman] are enjoined from making any material
changes, directly or indirectly, with respect to the assets purchased
by Dean from Bowman pursuant to their agreement ... including
the operation and policies affecting those assets ... pending entry of
a final order. 109
106. See 384 U.S. at 618; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 658-59
(D.N.J. 1964).
107. See 384 U.S. at 605·06.
108. See note 111 infra.
109. Order granting petition for preliminary injunction, No. 15,493, at 2 (Slip
Opinion, July 18, 1966) (emphasis added).
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It is clear that this order adopted the conceptual framework apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court majority in Dean Foods.
However, the possibility remains that another court of appeals may
think that the real purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent
all immediate effects of what may prove to be an improper merger,
and not to preserve the effectiveness of the divestiture remedy. This
position would probably lead to an order less accommodating to the
mergants than that entered by the Seventh Circuit. Nevertheless,
under either view it is fair to say that businessmen involved in
mergers may find it difficult to operate when their carefully gauged
plans can be at least temporarily thwarted, and perhaps wholly altered, before the legality of the proposed arrangement is finally
determined. 110 Thus, whichever theory is followed, the courts should
limit the duration of any injunction that they order so that there
will be pressure on the FTC to decide on the merits as quickly as
possible; in this way, some protection may be extended to mergants
who may not be found to have violated section 7 and who are entitled to proceed with their plans with a minimum of delay. 111 The
110. See note 76 supra. Despite the sale of Bowman home delivery routes authorized
by the Supreme Court's temporary stay, see note 19 supra, as well as by the preliminary
injunction, the losses incurred by Bowman's former operations during the first two
quarters of 1966 were $278,566 and $346,965 respectively. Motion for modification of
Seventh Circuit's preliminary injunction order (July 18, 1966).
In other situations involving government control of business activity, particularly
the regulation of stock ownership, it has been demonstrated that when courts attempt
to protect the status quo pending final determination on the merits, they are likely to
issue orders which themselves alter the status quo. See Daly, Current Trends in Relief
Under the Clayton Act, 70 DICK. L. REv. I, 14-17 (1965).
111. Temporary relief may substantially alter the normal incidents of stock ownership as well as regulate the enjoined corporation's day-to-day business activity. See
Daly, supra note 110. In fact, the mere grant of a temporary injunction in actions
brought by the Government has frequently occasioned the abandonment of the
planned merger. See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.
Pa. 1963), afj'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade
Cas. 11 81,958 r,11 .D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Parents Magazine Enterprises, Inc.,
1962 Trade Cas. 11 76,757 (N.D. Ill.), 1963 Trade Cas. 11 77,628 (N.D. Ill.). Compare,
e.g., United States v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (preliminary injunction denied-government voluntarily drops case). This is due in large
part to the fear that the changes wrought by such an injunction will so affect the
corporate structures involved as to necessitate abandonment of the planned merger,
despite the probability that the merger would ultimately be found legal. This apprehension accounts in part for Justice Fortas' great concern that a full consideration on
the merits will result in lengthy proceedings and delays while the FTC "wends its
leisurely way toward a wearying conclusion." 384 U.S. at 632.
For example, upon the conclusion of the trial examiner's !:.earing and within such
time as the hearing examiner may prescribe, the parties are required to file their
proposed findings and conclusions of law (FTC REG. 3.46); the hearing examiner then
has ninety days in which to file his initial decision (FTC REG. 3.51); notice of intention
to appeal such decision is due ten days thereafter; the appellate brief is due thirty
days after the initial decision; and the answering brief must be filed within thirty
days following receipt of the appellate brief (FTC REG. 3.52). Thereafter, the FTC
dockets the case for review, the filing of additional briefs being at the FTC's discretion
(FTC REG. 3.53). '.Thus, an indefinite period of time may elapse before FTC action.
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courts should try to force the FTC to complete its hearings before
the time when effective consummation of the merger could no longer
take place, but if this time cannot be determined, then they should
simply require that the FTC issue its final order within a reasonable
period of time.112

D.

Extensions

Professor Llewellyn once said that a case "may at the will of the
court stand either for the narrowest point to which its holding may
be reduced, or for the widest formulation that its ratio decidendi
will allow." 113 An interesting, but disturbing, aspect of Dean Foods
Moreover, the examples cited by Justice Fortas at 384 U.S. 597, 631-32 n.17 (1965) and
accompanying text would seem to indicate that he believes that it will be impossible
to impose any effective time limitation upon the FTC's consideration of a case. The
Seventh Circuit's order, however, would appear to accomplish such a result by limit·
ing the period of injunction to four months. It may be argued that the accelerating
device used by the Seventh Circuit on remand and approved by this Comment, that
is, imposing a time limit on the length of a preliminary injunction, forces the FTC
to abrogate its own procedures and is therefore an unwarranted order. The success
of this argument seems doubtful, however, since the grant of temporary relief is an
extraordinary and discretionary remedy in the first place.
One of the difficulties of accelerated proceedings is highlighted by the FTC's contention on appeal to the Commissioners in the Dean Foods litigation. Prompted by a
desire to have an ultimate determination before expiration of the four-month injunction, the Commissioners ordered the hearing examiner to file his initial decision within
sixty days of the close of evidence, thus giving the examiner only fifteen days after
the submission of the parties' initial and reply findings in which to prepare his decision. On appeal from the examiner's decision, the FTC argued that the examiner's
dismissal of the complaint should be rejected since it "virtually adopted in haec
verba respondent Dean's proposed findings of fact" and therefore reflected "an absence
of an independently reasoned analysis of the facts." Brief of Petitioner Before the
Federal Trade Commission, at 4-5. ·whether or not the contention was true, the
argument raises a danger inherent in upsetting and accelerating the normal FTC
procedures.
Securing a prompt FTC ruling is not a total solution for following their decision,
a petition for reconsideration may be filed within twenty days, the prevailing party
having an additional ten days in which to answer such request (FTC REG. 3.55). Barring reconsideration, however, court of appeals review is commenced by the filing of
a petition within sixty days after service of the FTC's order. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964).
In the Seventh Circuit, at least, forty days are then allowed for filing the transcript
of the record [7th Cir. R. 14(g)]; appellant's brief must be filed within thirty days
after the record is filed (7th Cir. R. 16); respondent's brief is due thirty days later;
and a further fifteen-day period is provided for the filing of a reply brief (7th Cir.
R. 16). No time limit is set for the filing of a decision by the court. Presumably,
similar delays would accompany proceedings in other circuits. In addition, if review
by the Supreme Court is sought, there will be a further lapse of time.
112. Then, upon an adequate showing of undue delay, the merging companies
would be able to get a vacation of the injunction. This, in turn, would discourage
delaying techniques on the part of the FTC. Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771, 784 (1965). In
this regard it may be useful to compare the Clayton Act's direction to district courts
with respect to Department of Justice proceedings to obtain preliminary relief. The
courts are directed to "proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination
of the case." 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). See generally note II supra and accompanying text.
113. LLEWELLYN, INTRODUCTION TO CASES ON SAf..1,:.5 ~ (1930).
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is that the decision leaves the door open for extending the preliminary injunctive power to other types of cases besides those potentially involving section 7 violations. If the FTC can proceed under
the All Writs Act in section 7 cases, the question arises whether it
will, or should, be allowed to obtain preliminary relief for other
kinds of antitrust violations. The Supreme Court wrote in Dean
Foods that "Congress has never restricted the power which the
courts of appeals may exercise under ... that [All Writs] Act," 114
and, in addition, the Court is apparently of the opinion that the
FTC has all powers essential to its operation except those specifically
denied to it. 115 Nothing in the case explicitly limits the FTC's authority to seek and obtain preliminary relief to section 7 cases; thus,
the FTC may well have the power to seek preliminary relief to
enjoin violations of section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act,11 6 section 3 of the Clayton Act, 117 and section 5 of the FTC Act. Since
the Dean Foods case itself involved an allegation of a violation of
section 5 of the FTC Act, 118 as well as the alleged section 7 violation,
the argument that preliminary relief should be available for other
types of violations of section 5 might seem particularly strong. 110 It
is submitted, however, that in Dean Foods the Court's most fundamental concern was the need for preserving an effective remedy.
Thus, the Dean Foods case should be interpreted to bar the FTC
from seeking preliminary relief in cases in which a denial of such
relief does not endanger the effectiveness of the final remedy, which
is the situation in most types of cases dealing with alleged antitrust
violations. 120 On the other hand, it has been suggested that some
violations, for example, advertising practices attacked as unfair
under section 5 of the FTC Act, may cause irreparable harm to the
public interest before the FTC can issue a final order. 121 It is arguable, by reasoning parallel to that of Justice Fortas' dissent in Dean
Foods, that in such cases the FTC should have implied power to
seek preliminary relief.
114. 384 U.S. at 608.
115. See note 37 supra.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
117. An exclusive-dealing case offers a possible example. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962):
Congress not only indicated that the "tests of illegality [under § 7] are intended
to be similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same
language as used in other sections of the Clayton Act", but also chose for § 7
language virtually identical to that of§ 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, which
had been interpreted by this court to require an examination of the interdependence of the market share foreclosed by, and the economic purpose of, the
vertical arrangement.
118. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1964).
119. The false advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics is already expressly subject to FTC suit for preliminary injunction under § 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1964).
120. For example, in price fixing or price discrimination cases, treble damages
would seemingly provide injured parties with a fully adequate remedy.
121. In the case of false advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics the FTC would
not have to :resort to implied power. See note 119 supra.
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It remains to be seen whether the FTC will exercise restraint
and petition for preliminary relief only when it is necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the final order. Such restraint seems doubtful, however, since some of the Commissioners have indicated
that they may try to obtain preliminary relief in Robinson-Patman
cases, 122 and since the FTC has long taken the position that it has
broad equitable powers under section 11 of the Clayton Act. 123
Moreover, it is quite possible that other agencies may now attempt
to assert implied powers to obtain preliminary relief under the All
Writs Act. Finally, as noted earlier, 124 it is conceivable that the FTC,
or other agencies following its lead, may attempt to obtain the right
to issue preliminary orders on its own, without resort to either
circuit or district courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the FTC has been granted a power that, while perhaps
founded on sound theoretical considerations, finds no conclusive
support in express statutory language. Although it may be desirable
to strengthen the remedial arsenal at the disposal of the FTC, the
procedural difficulties involved in implementing the decision in
Dean Foods, as well as the disruptive effects the decision may have
on the business community, argue strongly for limiting its application. The courts should adopt a strict standard for assessing FTC
requests for preliminary relief. Further, they should develop some
flexible procedure for conducting hearings, perhaps referring complex fact-finding duties to impartial masters or referees.
Despite the criticisms that may be directed at Dean Foods, the
Supreme Court's decision may have the salutary effect of eliminating the paralyzing delays that typically mark the FTC's consideration of merger cases. If the emphasis in ordering temporary relief
is placed upon protecting the divestiture remedy, as the Court's
opinion suggests that it should be, the courts of appeals will have
considerable leeway in framing their orders and they can force the
FTC to adjudicate the merits of a merger within a reasonable period
of time. Only if this interpretation of Dean Foods is adopted will
businessmen be able to carry on their plans for merger without complete frustration and uncertainty, for otherwise the FTC's ability to
obtain preliminary relief will give it virtually unbridled power over
the practical ability of companies to merge.

James H. Cohen*
122. See BNA ANTITRUST&: TRADE REG. REP. No. 267, at B-4, Aug. 23, 1967.
123. See, e.g., Freuhauf Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. tJ 17,292 (July 19, 1965);
Ekco Products Co., 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1l 71,487 (FTC 1964); see note 42 supra.
124. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
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